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This paper analyses the following propositions: (i) Are people generally self-interested; 
(ii) If people tend to be generous, what is their motive, i.e., whether they fear rejection or do 
they prefer fairness; and (iii) Is there any behavioural difference in bargaining between males 
and females? 
We conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment in a “same gender pairings” setting and 
observe the overall offers made by the proposers and the rejection rates of the responders. In 
order to test the second hypothesis we compare the offers that proposers anticipate will be 
accepted by the responders and the offers they actually make. If actual offer exceeds the 
minimum acceptable offer, anticipated by the proposer, we conclude that he is fair minded, 
otherwise, he is considered generous due to fear of rejection. In order to test the third 
hypothesis, we compare the offers and responses made by males and females in this game.  
Our results indicate that people on average, are not self-interested and tend to exhibit 
generosity. This behaviour is dictated by a fear of rejection rather than a concern for fairness. 
Further, this fear of rejection is very realistic, particularly, in the case of males, where the 
rejection rates for unfair offers are very high. 
Regarding gender differences, we find females to be more generous than males. 
However, reason for this generosity could not be found, since there is no significant difference 
in the degree of fairness or fear of rejection across the two genders. We also do not find any 
conclusive evidence that females are more reciprocal than males. 
Keywords: Ultimatum Game, Fairness, Reciprocity  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Earlier studies in Pakistan [Naeem and Zaman (2014) and Razzaque (2009)] have 
analysed generosity while examining gender differences in the ultimatum game. 
However, the motives behind observed generosity have not been tested in these studies. 
In the present study we test that when people tend to be generous, is it because they fear 
rejection or because they have a preference for fairness. 
The stylised form of negotiation, known as the ultimatum game, was first 
examined by Güth, Schmittberger, and Schwarze (1982). In the original experiment, 
proposers offered their opponents, on average, 36.7  percent of the pie, while one offer of 
30 percent was rejected. These results contradict the usual economic assumption of self-
interested individuals. 
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Some regard the ultimatum game as one of the classic demonstrations of human 
irrationality. The rational (game theoretic) analysis of the game is simple. The responder 
has the choice of whatever the proposer offered him or nothing. Since, something is 
better than nothing, we would expect the responder to take whatever the proposer offers 
him. Knowing this, we would expect the proposer to offer the minimum possible amount 
to the responder. 
The experimental studies, based on the ultimatum game reflect that results deviate 
from this Nash Equilibrium. When people play the ultimatum game in the lab, in a large 
number of human studies, conducted with different incentives in different countries, a 
majority of proposers offer 40-50 percent of the total amount, and about half of all 
responders reject offers below 30 percent. 
Given that it is not irrational for proposers to offer higher amounts, if they know 
that responders reject lower offers. However, as discussed above, it is irrational for the 
responders to reject the proposed division. So, why do they do it?  
A common interpretation is that responders would rather forgo some money than 
be treated unfairly (reciprocity). On the other hand, proposers’ behaviour is understood as 
one combining two motives; a taste for fairness and the anticipation that small offers may 
be turned down (fear of rejection) [Thaler (1988)].  
To answer this question, Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton (1994) compare 
offers in the ultimatum game with offers in the dictator game, to conclude that the more 
generous offers in the ultimatum game can be attributed more to fear of rejection than to 
fairness.  
Further, in the ultimatum game, gender has been observed to influence a variety of 
decisions, for instance, Eckel and Grossman (2001) observe chivalry (men accept lower 
offers from women than from men) and solidarity (women accept lower offers from 
women than from men). Solnick (2001) finds, in contrast, that players of both sexes 
demand more from women than from men. Both studies report that offers are lower to 
women than to men, and that offers from women and men are not significantly different. 
The purpose of our study is to examine the following propositions: 
(1) Are people generally self-interested? 
(2) If people tend to be generous, what is the motive; whether they fear rejection 
or have a preference for fairness? 
(3) Is there any behavioural difference in bargaining between males and females?  
(a) Are females more generous than males? 
(b) If yes, then what is the motive? 
(c) Are females more reciprocal in their behaviour than males? 
In this respect, we conduct an ultimatum bargaining experiment in a “same gender 
pairings” setting. In order to test the first statement we look at the overall offers made by 
the proposers and the rejection rates of the responders. In order to test the second 
proposition we compare the offers that proposers anticipate will be accepted by the 
responders and the offers they actually make. If actual offer exceeds the minimum 
acceptable offer anticipated by the proposer, we conclude that she is fair minded. 
Otherwise, she is being generous due to fear of rejection. In order to answer the third 
question, we compare the offers and responses of males and females in our experiment.  
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next section reviews the existing 
literature on gender differences across a variety of experiments. We then present the 
experimental design with the following section reporting the results of our experiment. 
The final section concludes. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A key insight from experimental economics is that people typically do not behave 
as selfishly as traditional economics assumes them to do. An experimental game that 
produces very convincing and consistent evidence in this regard is the ultimatum game. 
For instance, Oosterbeek, Sloof, and Van de Kuilen (2004) report the findings of a meta-
analysis of 37 papers with 75 results from the ultimatum game, to find that on average the 
proposer offers 40 percent of the pie to the responder. Also, on average 16 percent of the 
offers are rejected. 
It has been investigated whether offers depend on the amount of money at stake. 
Results tend to reject this as an explanation; studies in which raising the stakes in 
ultimatum games is the explicit focus, typically find no significant differences in the 
shares offered. However, the rejection rate decreases as the stakes are increased 
[Cameron (1999); Munier and Zaharia (1998); Slonim and Roth (1998); List and Cherry 
(2000)]. 
Another explanation for variation in average offers and rejection rates is based on 
gender differences. Contemporary feminist ideals of minimalist sex differences further 
reinforce this perspective; much of the relevant feminist research seeks to “shatter 
stereotypes about women’s characteristics and change people’s attitudes, by proving that 
women and men are essentially equivalent in their personalities, behavioural tendencies 
and intellectual abilities” [Eagly (1995)].  
Other studies suggest that many men and women assume that gender differences in 
negotiation exist and that they act consciously or unconsciously upon that assumption. 
One experiment based on an ultimatum game concludes that when the bidders know their 
partner’s gender from a simple name cue, both males and females make significantly 
lower (more competitive) offers to female respondents [Solnick (2001)].  
Using variations on the prisoner's dilemma, some studies find women to be more 
cooperative or generous [Aranoff and Tedeschi (1968); Meux (1973); Ortmann and Tichy 
(1999)]. Others find men to be more cooperative [Rapoport and Chammah (1965); Kahn 
Hottes, and Davis (1971); Mack, Auburn, and Knight (1971)]. Yet others find 
inconsistent or no significant difference between the genders [Dawes, McTavish, and 
Shaklee (1977); Stockard, Van de Kragt, and Dodge (1988); Orbell, Dawes, and 
Schwartz-Shea (1994)]. Similarly, Mason, Phillips, and Redington (1991) find no gender 
difference in a duopoly experiment. In public goods experiments, Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels (1993) find that women contribute significantly less than men, while Nowell 
and Tinkler (1994), on the other hand, report significantly higher contributions by groups 
of women than by mixed-sex or all-male groups. Bolton and Katok (1995) find no 
difference between the behaviour of men and women in dictator games. 
Eckel and Grossman (1996) examine gender differences in a punishment game, 
where subjects could choose to divide evenly a $10 (or $12) pie with someone who had 
previously been generous with another subject, or an $8 pie with someone who had 
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previously been ungenerous. They find that women are at least as likely as men to punish 
ungenerous counterparts. In a later study, Eckel and Grossman (1998) use a dictator 
experiment to find that women are more generous to their partners than men; women 
donate, on average, about twice as much as men.  
Regarding gender differences in the trust game Croson and Buchan (1999) give 
two explanations for female responders, returning more than male responders. First, it 
may be that women are more altruistic than men and thus they return a higher proportion 
of their earnings. However, if this were so one would expect to see a significant gender 
effect in both amounts, sent and proportion returned, not only in the later. Alternatively, 
the authors suggest that reciprocity could be driving the difference between male and 
female behaviour in this setting. This explanation involves women being more likely to 
reciprocate than males, rather than being simply more altruistic. 
With respect to the ultimatum game specifically, Botelho, Hirsh, and Rutström (2000) 
use experimental data, collected in Russia and in the United States to find that the average 
offer made by female subjects in the two countries equals about 45 percent of the pie, and the 
median offer is 48.8 percent and 42.5 percent in the United States and Russia, respectively. 
Corresponding figures for male subjects are 31.5 percent in the United States and 35.3 percent 
in Russia, while the median offer is 30 percent in both the countries. Further they report that, 
irrespective of the offer range, female subjects in both the United States and Russia exhibit 
substantially higher rejection rates than male subjects. 
Eckel and Grossman (2001) find that although women proposers are more 
generous than men, the difference is statistically weak. Further, they observe systematic 
differences in the behaviour of men and women; women are significantly more 
cooperative in that the probability that a woman will accept a given offer is higher than 
for a man. They also find that context is important; the gender of the respondent’s partner 
has a strong effect on the subject’s decision, in the sense that women both reject and get 
rejected less frequently (solidarity between women) and that male respondents do not 
usually reject unfair offers by female proposers (chivalry among men). 
Solnick (2001) suggests that both males and females tend to offer less to women, 
seemingly expecting women to be content with less. However, as indicated by the higher 
minimum acceptable offers chosen by females, this expectation seems to be wrong footed. 
Further, both genders set their minimum acceptable offers higher when they are facing a 
female proposer, thus indicating that they expect more generosity from females as compared 
to males. The author concludes that there are systematic differences caused by gender, and 
that these can have important and interesting consequences for economic behaviour. Further, 
the results have implications for experimental methodology. In particular, experimenters may 
need to take care in assuring that their studies are gender balanced, and that findings are due to 
economic factors and not because of the gender composition of their samples 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this body of work is that women 
are more socially-oriented (selfless) and men are more individually-oriented (selfish). If 
these differences carry over to economic decisions, when money is at stake, then theories 
that model agents as homogeneous, or being drawn from a common distribution, may 
predict behaviour inaccurately. If instead, gender differences in behaviour are 
overwhelmed by monetary incentives, then economic decisions are fundamentally 
different from those examined in other social and behavioural sciences. 
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Another relevant concern is the reconciliation of the fact that gender seems to 
manifest itself only in certain domains while remaining indiscernible in others. The only 
plausible answer to this question, as pointed out by Riley and McGinn (2002), may be 
that “Findings from gender research mirror the inductive conclusions one is likely to 
draw from daily experience: Men do not consistently act one way and women another, 
sometimes gender matters, and sometimes it does not”. 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A total of 146 (76 females and 70 males) subjects participate in this study. 
Graduate and undergraduate students are recruited from the student population at 
International Institute of Islamic Economics, International Islamic University, Islamabad. 
There are three sessions; first session comprised of 24 undergraduate male 
students, second session was of 76 graduate female students and third session consisted 
of 46 graduate male students. In each session half of the subjects make offers and the 
remaining half accept or reject these offers. 
Participants are paid in the form of 5 bonus marks in a subject that they are 
enrolled at that time of participating in the experiment (the worth of these marks is 
assumed to be high enough for the students to induce them to participate in the game). 
They bargain over Rs. 50
1
 in all the sessions. 
All the experimental sessions are conducted in large classrooms where there is 
plenty of room for participants to spread out for privacy. All sessions have two rounds. In 
the first round, the proposers are handed over a simple questionnaire which requires them 
to state what they expect is the minimum offer (expected MAO) that would be acceptable 
to the responder. Similarly, the responders are asked to state the minimum offer (MAO) 
that they will accept from the proposer.  
In the second round, the proposers are handed over an envelope containing actual 
money along with another envelope in which they could put the amount they intend to 
give to the responder. 
Once the proposers have made their decisions, they hand over the responders’ 
envelopes to the experimenter who distributes these envelopes between the responders 
randomly.  
Each responder after considering the offer made by the proposer decides whether 
to keep the envelope (in case of acceptance) or return it to the experimenter (in case of 
rejection). The proposers whose offers are rejected then return their envelopes, so that in 
case of rejection both the parties get nothing. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
The mean offer is Rs 22.88 (46 percent of the total amount), indicating that people 
are more generous than what economists predict. Further, this result is consistent with the 
standard experimental results. The offers are reported in Table 1.
2
 
 
1 Equivalent to US$ 0.83 at the exchange rate prevailing at the time the experiment was conducted. 
2 For tables and figures refer to the annexure. 
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The rejection rate for all the responders is 23.29 percent. It can be seen from Table 
2 that most of the rejections are for the offers that are below the 50 percent division. 
However, in some cases fair and hyper-fair are also rejected by the responders where they 
expect more generosity from the proposers. This rejection rate is also comparable with 
previous experimental results. 
The proportion of proposers who are generous due to their preference for fairness 
(who give more than what they think would be acceptable to the responder) is 27.4 
percent. The remaining proposers offer generously due to fear of rejection. Again this is 
analogous to the experimental findings that generosity on the part of the proposers is 
mainly attributable to the fear that the offer will be rejected and they would get nothing. 
Fairness only plays a smaller part in this behaviour. 
Regarding gender differences in proposer behaviour, males offer Rs 21.57 (43 
percent of the pie) to the responders while females offer Rs 24.08 (48 percent of the total 
amount) to their counterparts. The details of these offers are given in Tables 3 and 4.  
The rejection rates across genders vary by a considerable amount. The rejection 
rate for males is 40 percent while that for females is almost 8 percent. This difference 
may be attributed to the fact that female proposers generally offer higher shares as 
compared to male proposers. This is also evident from the data that most of the offers 
rejected by males lie in the 0.08-0.25 dollars range (10-30 percent share of the pie). 
Further, the variance in female offers is much less (0.05) as compared to males (0.12).  
The proportion of proposers exhibiting fairness is also considerably different, with 
female proposers exhibiting a greater level of fairness as compared to males. Almost 32 
percent of the females demonstrate fairness in their offers to the responders as compared 
to nearly 23 percent of the males. However, a considerable amount of proposers in both 
genders have fear of rejection as the main motivation behind their behaviour. Further, this 
fear of rejection is well founded, especially in males where many of the unfair offers are 
rejected. 
 
Inferential Statistics 
The results of various tests carried out with respect to the propositions stated in the 
introduction are reported as follows: 
(1) Are people generally self-interested? 
In order to test whether people systematically make generous offers or not, we 
applied the t-test of significance. The hypothesis in this case is that mean offer is not 
significantly different from Rs 5 (10 percent of the pie and the minimum amount that the 
proposer can offer to the responder as suggested by economists). The hypothesis is 
rejected at 5 percent level of significance (the results are reported in Table 5). Thus we 
can conclude that people do not behave selfishly as proposed by game theorists. 
(2) If people tend to be generous, what is the motive? 
In this respect we use the one-tailed z-test of proportions to test the hypothesis that 
proportion of fair offers is not significantly different from 0.5, i.e., we expect that taste 
for fairness and fear of rejection figure equally in the proposer behaviour. Again, the 
hypothesis is rejected at 5 percent level of significance. The results are reported in Table 
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6. We can further conclude that fairness has a lesser role to play in people’s decisions as 
compared to fear of rejection. 
(3) Is there any behavioural difference in bargaining between males and females? 
(a) Are females more generous than males? 
We apply the test of equality of means (Table 7). The null hypothesis is that both 
males and females make equal offers on average. The mean test shows that the difference 
between mean offers is significant at 10 percent level of significance thus indicating that, 
on average, male proposers offer less than female proposers. This may indicate that 
females are more generous than males.  
In addition we also regress offers made on the gender of the proposer. The detailed 
results are reported in Table 8. The regression indicates that gender has a significant 
effect on the mean offer. 
The results of the equality of variance test (Table 9) indicate that male offers have 
a greater variance than that of female offers and that the difference in two variances is 
significant (low p-values of four out of five tests). Therefore, we can conclude that 
women deviate from the generous offers less frequently than males. 
(b) What is the motive behind female generosity? 
In this case we test whether females are generous because they have a greater taste 
for fairness as compared to men or that they have a greater fear of rejection which causes 
them to offer generously. Again we use the z-test of proportions to test the hypothesis 
that proportion of fair offers made by females is equal to that of males. The results (Table 
10) indicate that the hypothesis is accepted at 5 percent level of significance. So we 
cannot conclude that the more generous offers made by females are due to the reason that 
they are more fairer or that they fear rejection more than the males. 
(c) Are females more reciprocal than males? 
In this case we fit a Logit model by regressing acceptance rates for males and 
females on the offers made by each gender respectively. The results (Tables 11 and 12) 
indicate that, for females, offer has an insignificant effect on rejection/acceptance. On the 
contrary, for males, offer has a significant effect on rejection/acceptance. In other words, 
the amount offered significantly explains rejection/acceptance behaviour of male 
respondents only. 
Further, in order to determine gender based differences in behaviour, probabilities 
of accepting an offer are calculated for each gender (Table 13).  The information is also 
given in Figure 1. 
As can be seen from this figure, the probability of females accepting a given 
offer is greater than that of males for all offers. This indicates that female responders 
are more likely to accept both unfair and fair offers than males. This result seems to 
be consistent with the finding that males have a higher rejection rate than females .  
Also, it is important to note that the probability of female accepting an unfair offer is 
far greater than males (for example, the chances of a female accepting 10 percent, 20 
percent and 30 percent shares are nine, six and three times greater than those for 
males, respectively). 
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Fig. 1. Probability of Acceptance for Different Offers 
 
 
Combining the lower rejection rates and higher acceptance probabilities of females 
for unfair offers, we can conclude that females are not necessarily more reciprocal than 
males. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The most elementary result, also verified by many other experimental studies, is that 
people in general are not selfish, at least not to the extent that economists assume.  This 
calls for a serious rethinking by economists, since the existing neoclassical microeconomic 
theory is firmly based on the assumption of self-interested economic agents.  
Secondly, generosity is mainly grounded in fear of rejection rather than any 
specific preference for fairness. Again this is a replication of previous studies. Further, 
this fear of rejection is very realistic, particularly, in case of males where the rejection 
rates for unfair offers are very high. 
Lastly, regarding gender differences, we find females to be more generous than 
males. However, the reason for this greater generosity could not be determined, since 
there is no significant difference in the degree of fairness or fear of rejection between the 
two genders. May be economists should look towards psychological motives rather than 
purely economic motives for the observed differences in behaviour. We also do not find 
any conclusive evidence that females are more reciprocal than males. 
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ANNEXURE 
 
Table 1  
Offers, Expected MAOs and MAOs for the Entire Group 
Game 
Expected 
MAO MAO Offer Game 
Expected 
MAO MAO Offer 
01 20 15 20 38 25 25 25 
02 25 25 30 39 5 20 20 
03 25 25 25 40 20 25 20 
04 25 25 25 41 20 25 20 
05 20 15 20 42 30 35 30 
06 20 10 20 43 20 25 25 
07 20 25 25 44 15 30 15 
08 10 15 15 45 20 30 30 
09 20 25 25 46 5 15 10 
10 20 25 25 47 5 10 30 
11 25 25 30 48 15 35 15 
12 15 20 20 49 25 20 25 
13 25 25 25 50 5 10 5 
14 25 25 25 51 5 25 5 
15 20 25 25 52 25 25 25 
16 25 5 25 53 30 25 30 
17 20 25 25 54 25 25 25 
18 25 30 25 55 5 0 20 
19 25 25 25 56 15 25 15 
20 25 25 25 57 30 20 30 
21 25 25 25 58 25 15 25 
22 25 25 25 59 25 25 25 
23 25 25 25 60 15 20 15 
24 20 25 20 61 5 30 10 
25 25 25 25 62 30 5 30 
26 25 25 25 63 25 25 25 
27 25 25 25 64 25 25 25 
28 25 25 25 65 25 20 25 
29 25 25 25 66 25 25 25 
30 25 25 25 67 20 15 20 
31 25 25 20 68 30 50 30 
32 20 25 25 69 25 25 25 
33 20 25 25 70 25 15 25 
34 25 20 25 71 30 5 30 
35 25 25 25 72 10 25 10 
36 25 25 20 73 10 25 15 
37 20 50 25     
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Table 2 
Acceptance / Rejection and Fairness / Fear of Rejection 
Game Offer Accepted /Rejected Fairness Game Offer Accepted /Rejected Fairness 
1 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 38 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
2 30 Accepted Fair 39 20 Accepted Fair 
3 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 40 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
4 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 41 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
5 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 42 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
6 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 43 25 Accepted Fair 
7 25 Accepted Fair 44 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
8 15 Accepted Fair 45 30 Accepted Fair 
9 25 Accepted Fair 46 10 Rejected Fair 
10 25 Accepted Fair 47 30 Accepted Fair 
11 30 Accepted Fair 48 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
12 20 Accepted Fair 49 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
13 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 50 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
14 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 51 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
15 25 Accepted Fair 52 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
16 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 53 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
17 25 Accepted Fair 54 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
18 25 Rejected Fear of Rejection 55 20 Accepted Fair 
19 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 56 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 57 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
21 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 58 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
22 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 59 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
23 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 60 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
24 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 61 10 Rejected Fair 
25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 62 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
26 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 63 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
27 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 64 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
28 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 65 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
29 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 66 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
30 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 67 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
31 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 68 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
32 25 Accepted Fair 69 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
33 25 Accepted Fair 70 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
34 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 71 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
35 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 72 10 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
36 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 73 15 Rejected Fair 
37 25 Accepted Fair     
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Table 3 
Data for Male Participants 
Game Expected MAO MAO Offer Accepted / Rejected Fairness 
1 5 20 20 Accepted Fair 
2 20 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
3 20 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
4 30 35 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
5 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
6 15 30 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
7 20 30 30 Accepted Fair 
8 5 15 10 Rejected Fair 
9 5 10 30 Accepted Fair 
10 15 35 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
11 25 20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
12 5 10 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
13 5 25 5 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
14 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
15 30 25 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
16 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
17 5 0 20 Accepted Fair 
18 15 25 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
19 30 20 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
20 25 15 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
21 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
22 15 20 15 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
23 5 30 10 Rejected Fair 
24 30 5 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
25 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
26 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
27 25 20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
28 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
29 20 15 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
30 30 50 30 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
31 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
32 25 15 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
33 30 5 30 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
34 10 25 10 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
35 10 25 15 Rejected Fair 
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Table 4 
Data for Female Participants 
Game Expected MAO MAO Offer Accepted / Rejected Fairness 
1 20 15 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
2 25 25 30 Accepted Fair 
3 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
4 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
5 20 15 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
6 20 10 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
7 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
8 10 15 15 Accepted Fair 
9 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
10 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
11 25 25 30 Accepted Fair 
12 15 20 20 Accepted Fair 
13 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
14 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
15 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
16 25 5 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
17 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
18 25 30 25 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
19 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
20 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
21 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
22 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
23 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
24 20 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
25 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
26 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
27 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
28 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
29 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
30 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
31 25 25 20 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
32 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
33 20 25 25 Accepted Fair 
34 25 20 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
35 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
36 25 25 20 Rejected Fear of Rejection 
37 20 50 25 Accepted Fair 
38 25 25 25 Accepted Fear of Rejection 
 
Table 5 
Are Offers Significantly Different from Purely Selfish Offers 
Overall Mean Offer 22.88 
Hypothesised Value 5 
SE 5.65 
t-statistic 3.17 
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Table 6 
Test for Equality of Fairness and Fear of Rejection in Decision Making 
Overall Fairness 27.40% 
Hypothesised Value 50.00% 
SE 0.06 
Z  -3.86 
 
Table 7 
Test for Equality of Means between Genders 
Method df Value Probability 
t-test 71 1.93 0.0575 
Anova F-statistic (1, 71) 3.73 0.0575 
     
Analysis of Variance 
Source of Variation df Sum of Sq. Mean Sq. 
Between 1 114.56 114.56 
Within 71 2181.34 30.72 
Total 72 2295.89 31.89 
     
Category Statistics 
    Std. Err. 
Variable Count Mean Std. Dev. of Mean 
Male 35 21.57 7.45 1.26 
Female 38 24.08 2.81 0.46 
All 73 22.88 5.65 0.66 
 
Table 8 
Regression Results Where Offers are Regressed Over Gender 
Dependent Variable: OFFER 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 73 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
C 21.57 0.94 23.02 0.0000 
DUMMYMF 2.51 1.30 1.93 0.0575 
R-squared 0.05     Mean dependent var 22.88 
Adjusted R-squared 0.04     S.D. dependent var 5.65 
S.E. of regression 5.54     Akaike info criterion 6.29 
Sum squared resid 2181.34     Schwarz criterion 6.35 
Log likelihood -227.58     F-statistic 3.73 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.09     Prob(F-statistic) 0.058 
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Table 9 
Test for Equality of Variance between Genders 
Method df Value Probability  
F-test (37, 34) 7.02 0.0000  
Siegel-Tukey (1, 71) 0.36 0.5477  
Bartlett 1 29.64 0.0000  
Levene (1, 71) 33.68 0.0000  
Brown-Forsythe (1, 71) 16.79 0.0001  
      
Category Statistics 
   Mean Abs. Mean Abs. Mean Tukey- 
Variable Count Std. Dev. Mean Diff. Median Diff. Siegel Rank 
Male 35 7.45 6.20 5.71 35.57 
Female 38 2.81 1.98 1.45 38.32 
All 73 5.65 4.01 3.49 37.00 
Bartlett weighted standard deviation:  5.54 
 
Table 10 
Test for Equality of Proportions between Genders 
Female Fairness 0.32 
Female Fear of Rejection 0.68 
Female Observations 38 
Male Fairness 0.23 
Male Fear of Rejection 0.77 
Male Observations 35 
  
SE  0.1036 
  
Z  0.8422 
 
Table 11 
Logit Model Where Acceptance Rates are Regressed Over Offer (Male) 
Dependent Variable: Acceptance Male 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 35 
Included observations: 35 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C –6.23 2.23 –2.79 0.0052 
Male 0.31 0.10 3.09 0.0020 
Mean dependent var 0.60 S.D. dependent var 0.50 
S.E. of regression 0.33 Akaike info criterion 0.88 
Sum squared resid 3.63 Schwarz criterion 0.97 
Log likelihood –13.44 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.91 
Restr. log likelihood –23.56 Avg. log likelihood -0.38 
LR statistic (1 df) 20.23 McFadden R-squared 0.43 
Probability(LR stat) 6.87E-06    
Obs with Dep=0 14 Total obs 35 
Obs with Dep=1 21    
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Table 12 
Logit Model Where Acceptance Rates are Regressed Over Offer (Female) 
Dependent Variable: Acceptance Female 
Method: ML - Binary Logit 
Sample: 1 38 
Included observations: 38 
Convergence achieved after 4 iterations 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob. 
C –3.76 4.15 –0.91 0.3642 
FEMALE 0.27 0.18 1.46 0.1455 
Mean dependent var 0.92 S.D. dependent var 0.27 
S.E. of regression 0.27 Akaike info criterion 0.60 
Sum squared resid 2.69 Schwarz criterion 0.69 
Log likelihood –9.47 Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.63 
Restr. log likelihood –10.50 Avg. log likelihood -0.25 
LR statistic (1 df) 2.05 McFadden R-squared 0.10 
Probability(LR stat) 0.151839    
Obs with Dep=0 3 Total obs 38 
Obs with Dep=1 35    
 
Table 13 
Probabilities for Males and Females of Accepting an Offer 
Offer Males Females 
0 0.0020 0.0227 
5 0.0092 0.0817 
10 0.0422 0.2546 
15 0.1721 0.5672 
20 0.4952 0.8341 
25 0.8224 0.9507 
30 0.9563 0.9867 
35 0.9904 0.9965 
40 0.9980 0.9991 
45 0.9996 0.9998 
50 0.9999 0.9999 
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